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Copyright law and the supply of creative work
17. Copyright law and the supply of creative 
work: evidence from the movies
Ivan Paak Liang Png and Qiu- hong Wang*1
there is almost no empirical evidence on the extent to which copyright law 
works in the sense of increasing the production of creative work. Here, we study 
the impact of two major changes in copyright law – the extension of copyright 
term and the european rental directive – on the production of movies.
 in a panel of  23 oeCd countries, among which 19 extended copyright 
term at various times between 1991–2005, we found no statistically robust 
evidence that copyright term extension was associated with higher movie 
production.
 in a panel of 17 european countries between 1991–2005, we found no statisti-
cally robust evidence that compliance with the rental directive was associated 
with higher movie production.
 the extension of  copyright term and european rental directive were 
particularly pertinent to the movie industry. movies are particularly long- 
lived, the rental directive specifically addressed the movie industry, and, 
unlike other copyrightable products, sequential innovation is not important 
in movies. Hence, if  major changes in copyright law had no discernable 
impact  on movie production, it seems the case for copyright law is weak 
indeed.
 * this chapter is a combination of two earlier working papers, ‘Copyright 
duration and the supply of Creative work’ and ‘Copyright Law and movie 
production: the european rental directive’. we gratefully acknowledge finan-
cial assistance from the ip academy of singapore and the Center for the 
analysis of property rights and innovation, University of texas at dallas, 
and the hospitality of nuffield College, oxford, at which part of this work was 
undertaken. we thank matthew Baker, Brendan Cunningham, winand emons, 
Gerald dworkin, Ken sokoloff, arun sundararajan, andre Lange, Kai- lung 
Hui, david Levine, Julian wright, mark Glancy, patricia Funk, Yuan Yuan 
Chen, and participants at the 2005 ioms workshop, the 2006 serCi Congress, 
the 2007 aea meetings and seminars at the University of oxford, the H.K. 
University of science and technology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
the University of washington and University of tokyo for helpful advice, and 
Chin Kah Jin and Jessica waye for able research assistance. we gratefully 
acknowledge funding from the ip academy of singapore and the academic 
research Fund.
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1. introdUCtion
article 1, section 8, Clause 8 of the U.s. Constitution (the so- called ‘patent 
and Copyright Clause’) provides that, ‘the Congress shall have power . . . 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.’
as the patent and Copyright Clause suggests, generally, copyright must 
strike a delicate balance between two considerations:
●● Broader and longer protection increases the return to creators of 
new work, and in the long term, encourages more creative work;
●● narrower and shorter protection increases the use of existing crea-
tive work, and hence, raises the benefit to end- users and also facili-
tates new creations that build upon earlier work.
there is no disagreement about the directions of these two considerations 
(plant 1934; Gallini and scotchmer 2002). recent theoretical analyses have 
shown that creators might be sufficiently motivated by first- mover advan-
tage (Boldrin and Levine 2008 and 2009), so that stronger copyright might 
not affect the creation of new work. indeed, whole industries have arisen 
without the protection of copyright. examples include academic works, 
open- source software, and the collection of material on the internet gener-
ally called ‘web 2.0’.
the theoretical analyses and rapid growth of non- copyrighted indus-
tries beg the question of the extent to which copyright law even works – in 
the sense of increasing the production of creative work. if  copyright law 
is weakened, would more or less software, movies, music, and books be 
created? How much more or less? there is almost no empirical evidence on 
this issue (png 2006).
notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence, the various indus-
tries have pressed relentlessly for the expansion of copyright. Under the 
auspices of free trade negotiations, the U.s. has compelled various coun-
tries, including singapore, Chile, and australia to expand copyright law 
and enforcement.
Here, we study the impact of two major changes in copyright law – the 
extension of copyright term and the european rental directive – on the 
production of movies. we focus on movies for various reasons. Unlike soft-
ware, databases, and books, there is little sequential innovation in movies. 
rarely does one director cut and paste older movies to make a new one. in 
the absence of sequential innovation (scotchmer 1991; Bessen and maskin 
2009), the impact of copyright law on movie production should be positive.
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Beginning in 1993, various european countries extended the term of 
copyright from author’s life plus 50 years to author’s life plus 70 years. 
From 1998 onward, the U.s. and other countries followed. in 2002, the 
U.s. supreme Court heard the Eldred case,1 which challenged the sonny 
Bono Copyright term extension act (Ctea). in an amici curiae brief  
(akerlof et al. 2002), five nobel laureates and 12 other economists argued 
that, in present value terms, the extension of copyright term provided a 
very small return, and hence would have little impact on the creation of 
new works. Justice Breyer (2003), page 14, quoted the brief  with approval, 
‘any added incentive to create new works in the future is insignificant’. 
However, Liebowitz and margolis (2005) countered that the impact 
depended on the elasticity of supply of new works, which might be high.
we study a panel of 23 organisation for economic Co- operation and 
development (oeCd) countries, among which 19 extended copyright 
term at various times between 1991–2005. we find no statistically robust 
evidence that copyright term extension was associated with higher movie 
production. this negative finding spanned various specifications and sub- 
samples, accounting for lags, outliers, and possible omitted variables such 
as government funding, and also with respect to the production of music 
Cds and books.
Beginning in 1992, various european countries revised their copyright 
laws to comply with the rental directive, which specified rental and 
lending rights, and copyrights for performers, music and film producers, 
and broadcasters. these changes were part of a broad effort to harmonize 
laws and regulation and remove barriers to trade within the european 
Union.
we studied a panel of 17 european countries during the period 1991–
2005. we found no statistically robust evidence that compliance with the 
rental directive was associated with higher movie production. this nega-
tive finding spanned various specifications and sub- samples, including 
the specification of compliance, accounting for lags, outliers, and possible 
omitted variables such as government funding, and also with respect to the 
production of music Cds and books.
apparently, two major changes in copyright law had no significant effect 
on creation of new work in a significant copyright- protected industry – 
movies. our results provide empirical support for theoretical analyses that 
stronger copyright would not increase the production of creative work in 
the industries and samples that we analyzed.
 1 Eric Eldred et al., v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.s. supreme 
Court, no. 01- 618.
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2. previoUs researCH
surprisingly, despite persistent controversy, there has been relatively little 
empirical research into the impact of copyright law on the production of 
creative work (png 2006).
Until 1891, U.s. copyright law did not provide any protection to foreign 
authors. then, Congress passed the international Copyright act, which 
provided copyright protection to foreign authors, and through recipro-
cal recognition, provided copyright protection to U.s. authors in foreign 
jurisdictions. the act did not have a substantial impact on the number of 
full- time authors in the U.s. (Khan 2004).
the 1998 U.s. Ctea motivated several studies. the Ctea had positive 
but insignificant effects on U.s. movie production (Hui and png 2002), 
and U.s. copyright registrations (Landes and posner 2003). related to 
the Ctea, two studies reported on the longevity of  copyrighted work. 
in 1998, 40 percent of  movies created in 1929–32 and 65 percent of  those 
created in 1933–41 were still being played commercially (rappaport 
1998). Liebowitz and margolis (2005) observed that, of  a sample of  236 
titles reviewed by Book Review Digest in the 1920s, 41 percent were still 
in print 58 years later. they remarked that, while the additional return to 
creators from copyright term extension might be small in present value, 
the impact on new works depended on the elasticity of  supply, which 
might be high.
through extensive legal research, reynolds (2003) compiled an index of 
copyright law for multiple countries. He found that the numbers of movies 
submitted to the Cannes Film Festival in a sample of 81–136 countries 
between 1965–2002 were positively and significantly related to his copy-
right index, and were positively, but not significantly, related to copyright 
term.2
Baker and Cunningham (2005) provided the strongest empirical evidence 
of the incentive effect of copyright law to date. Court decisions broadening 
copyright protection were associated with increases in copyright applica-
tions in Canada and the U.s. in addition, copyright applications were 
higher when the economic growth was slower, which is consistent with 
creative activity being complementary with leisure.
Besides the contribution of Baker and Cunningham (2005), the impact 
 2 reynolds’ (2003) results should be interpreted with caution. the mean 
number of submissions was 0.34 with a standard deviation of 1.60, suggesting that 
the data comprised many zeroes with a few positive integers. with a count depend-
ent variable, the usual ordinary least squares test statistics are not valid.
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of copyright law on the production of new creative work continues to be 
an open question.3
3. CopYriGHt term
on october 29, 1993, the european economic Community (eeC) Council 
of ministers issued directive 93/98/Cee to harmonize the term of pro-
tection of copyright and certain related rights with effect from July 1, 
1995.4 this so- called ‘Copyright term directive’ was just one of multiple 
directives issued to harmonize copyright laws with the overall objective 
of establishing a single european market. the eeC became the european 
Union (eU) with effect from november 1, 1993.
prior to the issuance of the directive, copyright term differed in the 
various eU member states. 5 For literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works, the directive specified a term of author’s life plus 70 years, while, for 
audiovisual works, the directive specified a term of 70 years following the 
death of the last survivor among the principal director, the screenplay and 
dialogue authors, and the music composer. significantly, the extension of 
term applied retroactively to any existing work with copyright still in force.
at the time of the directive, German copyright law specified a term 
of the author’s life plus 70 years, which was the longest among the eU 
member states. the Commission decided to increase the term elsewhere 
to match the copyright term in Germany. politically, this was the most 
convenient choice (dworkin 1994). at various dates between 1993–97, the 
e.U. member states revised their laws to implement the directive.6
the Copyright term directive had a broader impact. notably, pursu-
ant to the agreement on the european economic area (eea) of 1992, 
european Free trade area (eFta) member states, austria, Finland, 
sweden, norway, iceland, and Liechtenstein, committed to harmonize 
 3 various studies have shown that copyright law does affect creator’s earnings 
(Baker and Cunningham 2006; Boyle, o’Connor, and nazzaro 2008), without 
considering the impact, if any, on production. Building on various empirical 
studies, pollock (2008) analyzed the optimal copyright term.
 4 directive 93/98/Cee, O.J. no. L 290 of 24 november 1993.
 5 most countries conformed to the Berne Convention for the protection 
of Literary and artistic works, which provided a term of the author’s life plus 
50 years (Brownlee 1996: 596). For cinematographic works, the Berne Convention 
provided a term of 50 years from the publication or making of the work.
 6 the academic literature (Brownlee 1996: footnotes 12 and 90), Bard and 
Kurlantzick 1999:16–17) gives no indication that industry influenced the timing of 
the revisions of national copyright laws.
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their laws with those of the e.U. (Gotzen 1998).7 the eea agreement 
took effect in 1994. although an eea member, switzerland did not 
accede to the eea agreement. in addition, the various Central and 
east european countries seeking eU membership, including the Czech 
republic, Hungary, poland, and slovakia, also had to conform.
Further, in 1998, the U.s. Congress had passed the Ctea to align 
copyright term in the U.s. with that in the eU this allowed U.s. copyright 
owners to enjoy reciprocal copyright term extension in eU member coun-
tries.8 the Ctea was challenged as unconstitutional, but upheld by the 
supreme Court in 2002.9
through extensive legal research, we compiled table 17.1 below, which 
reviews legal changes, if  any, with respect to the term of copyright protec-
tion in oeCd member countries between 1991–2005. only four oeCd 
members did not extend copyright term during the period – Canada, 
Germany, Korea, and new Zealand.10
the extension of copyright term was particularly pertinent to the movie 
industry. among the various forms of copyrightable work, movies are 
particularly long- lived (rapapport 1998), hence movie producers would 
benefit relatively the most from extension of copyright term. this is 
another reason, besides the absence of sequential innovation, to focus on 
movies in studying the impact of copyright term extension.
3.1 Data and Specification
the internet movie database (‘imdb’) proclaims itself  to be ‘earth’s 
biggest movie database’ and is sponsored by amazon.com. Using 
imdbpro, we extract information about various characteristics of movies 
created in oeCd member countries between 1991–2005. referring to 
table 17.2 below, for each country and year, we obtain information 
from euromonitor international’s Global market information database 
 7 agreement on the european economic area of 2 may 1992 (O.J. no. K 1 of 
3 January 1994), protocol no. 28.
 8 directive 93/98/Cee, art. 7, specifically provided that the copyright term 
extension would not apply to works created outside the eU. accordingly, foreign-
ers could benefit from longer copyright in the eU only if similar legislation were 
enacted in their home countries (Bard and Kurlantzik 1999: 175).
 9 the Eldred case, see note 1.
10 Germany extended its copyright term to author’s life plus 70 years in 1965. 
austria already complied with the Copyright term directive for all works except 
movies, hence it had to revise its law to extend the copyright term for movies only. 
Canada and new Zealand extended copyright term in 1994, but only minimally, 
so, we ignored these changes.
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Table 17.1 Changes in copyright term, 1991–2005
Country effective 
year of term 
extension1
Law
australia 2005 Copyright Legislation amendment act, 2004.
austria 1996 Federal Law with which the Copyright act 
and the 1980 Copyright act amendment are 
amended (BGBi no. 151/1996).
Belgium 1994 act on author’s right and neighboring rights 
of 30 June 1994.
Canada none n.a.2
Czech  
  republic
2000 Law no. 121/2000 Coll. of 7 april 2000 on 
Copyright, rights related to Copyright and on 
the amendment of Certain Laws (Copyright 
act).
denmark 1995 L395 of 13 June 1995.
Finland 1996 Law no. 1654 of 22 december 1995.
France 1995 intellectual property Code, article L123, as 
amended by Law 97–283 of 27 march 1997.
Germany none n.a.3
Greece 1993 Copyright act of 1993.
Hungary 1994 Copyright act, as amended by act vii of 1994.
iceland 1996 Copyright act (no. 73 of may 29, 1972), as 
amended by act no. 145/1996.
ireland 1995 s.i. no. 158 of 1995.
italy 1997 Copyright act, as amended by Legislative decree 
no. 654 of 26 may 1997.
Japan 2003 Copyright Law, article 54, as amended on June 
12, 2003.
Luxembourg 1997 Laws of 29 march 1972 and 23 september 1975 
on Copyright, as amended on 8 september 1997.
mexico (a) 1997
(b) 2003
(a) Federal Law on Copyright of 24 december 
1996;
(b) Federal Law on Copyright 
netherlands 1995 Copyright act, as amended by Law 652 of 21 
december 1995 (stb. 1995, 651, 652, and 653).
new Zealand none n.a.4
norway 1995 act no. 2 of may 12, 1961, relating to 
Copyright in Literary, scientific and artistic 
works, etc., as amended by Law no. 27 of 2 June 
1995.
poland 2000 act on Copyright and neighboring rights, as 
amended on 9 June 2000.
portugal 1995 d.L. no. 334/97 of 27 november 1997.
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(Gmid) about other national characteristics that might possibly affect 
movie production – population, Gdp per capita, personal computer (pC) 
ownership, internet usage, and real interest rates. owing to limitations of 
data, our study is limited to 23 countries.11
our empirical strategy is to employ difference- in- differences,  exploiting 
11 these reasons are explained in table 17.2, note 1.
Table 17.1 (continued)
Country effective 
year of term 
extension1
Law
slovakia 1998 act no. 383/ 1997 of 5 december 1997 – 
Copyright act and act on Changes and 
amendments of Customs act.
south Korea none n.a.
spain 1995 intellectual property act, as amended by Law 
no. 27 of 11 october 1995.
sweden 1996 act on Copyright in Literary and artistic works, 
as amended by Law of 12 april 1996.
switzerland 1993 Federal Law on Copyright and neighboring 
rights, as amended by the Law of 9 october 
1992
turkey 1995 Law on artistic and intellectual works (no. 5846 
of 5 december 1951), as amended in 07/06/1995.
United  
  Kingdom
1995 Copyright designs and patents act, as amended 
by the duration of Copyright and rights in 
performances regulations (s.i. no. 3297 of 
1995).
United states 1998 sonny Bono Copyright term extension act, 
1998
Notes:
1.  For eU and eea members, if  no other information could be found to the contrary, 
assumed that the country complied with directive 93/98/Cee.
2.  De minimus change in 1994: From author’s life plus 50 years to author’s life plus 
remainder of the calendar year of death plus 50 years.
3. Copyright term was extended to author’s life plus 70 years in 1965.
4.  De minimus change in 1994: from 50 years after making of the work to 50 years after 
later of making or first publication (Copyright act of 1994).
Sources: e.C. (undated); Geller (1999); stewart and sandison (1989); world intellectual 
property organization.
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differences among countries as to whether they did or did not extend 
copyright term, and among those that did so, in the timing of the exten-
sions. the ‘difference in differences’ specification accounts for any general 
changes in market or technological conditions that might possibly have 
affected the incentive to produce movies when the directive took effect 
(Bertrand et al. 2004). we specify:
Table 17.2 OECD movie industry: Descriptive statistics
variable Unit source mean std. dev. min max
Compliance  
  indicator
– own 
research
0.5942 0.4918 0 1
Copyright term  
  extension 
Years own 
research
81.61 18.55 50 125
Govt funding ‘000 euro Korda 63 225.32 103 079.7 381.94 523 452.9
movie  
  production
– imdB 107.70 195.37 2.00 1538.00
movie  
  production 
excluding 
co- production
– imdB 79.46 169.09 0.10 1391.00
movie  
  production 
adjusted for 
co- production
– imdB 91.27 180.37 1.50 1452.37
movie  
 production
– Fii 67.99 115.03 0.00 625.00
movie  
  production 
excluding 
co- production
– Fii 54.94 99.82 0.00 559.00
movie  
  production 
adjusted for 
co- production
– Fii 60.72 106.68 0.00 589.25
Gdp per capita thousand 
Usd
Gmid 23.11 7.57 3.08 47.79
population thousand Gmid 42 753.54 59 923.07 3521.00 296 410.00
pC per capita % Gmid 36.79 21.36 0.50 84.00
internet users  
  per capita
% Gmid 20.87 21.04 0.01 83.02
real interest 
rate
% oeCd 3.78 2.17 −3.57 15.06
Cd albums – iFpi 282.16 250.81 17.00 942.50
Cd releases – iFpi 14 314.42 9230.80 1451 38 900
Books – ipa 28 470.00 26 322.90 3441 110 155
Books – UnesCo 18 301.44 13 428.15 4985 49 123
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 log(moviesit) 5 f(termit, Xit).
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of movies 
created in that country- year, while, among the explanatory variables, 
termit is the number of years by which the term of copyright was 
extended, and Xit is a vector of other variables that might possibly 
have affected movie production. Unless otherwise stated, all variables 
are specified in natural logarithms, and to minimize multi- collinearity, 
all demographic variables other than population are specified on a per 
capita basis.
an immediate concern is secular differences in national vis- a- vis in-
ternational co- production of movies, as illustrated by Figure 17.1 above. 
to account for this, we specify the dependent variable in two ways. our 
main estimates focus on the number of movies adjusted by the number 
of co- producing countries, e.g., if  a movie was produced in the U.s. and 
Germany, then it would contribute 0.5 to the number of movies created in 
the U.s. and Germany respectively for that year. in a robustness check, we 
disregard movies with co- productions and specify the dependent variable 
as nationally produced movies.12
12 to collect the data, we queried the imdbpro by country and year, and 
then matched movies by title. accordingly, we could only adjust for co- production 
among the oeCd member countries.
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as a preliminary, Figure 17.2 depicts below, for each country, the time 
profile of movie production and the effective date of copyright term exten-
sion, if  any. apparently, there was no discernable impact of copyright term 
extension on movie production.
3.2 Estimates
our baseline specification of model (1) is a regression of movie production 
on copyright term extension, as well as various demographic and financial 
characteristics – Gdp per capita, population, computer ownership and 
internet access, and real interest rate, with year and country fixed effects. 
as a preliminary, we test for and detect heteroskedasticity but not serial 
correlation. accordingly, we estimate the baseline specification using 
feasible generalized least squares, as this procedure is more efficient than 
ordinary least squares in the presence of heteroskedasticity (wooldridge 
2006: 290–93, 428–9).
table 17.3, column (a), reports the results. the coefficients of Gdp per 
capita and population are positive and significant, and the coefficient of 
the real interest rate is negative but imprecisely estimated. the coefficient 
of copyright term extension is negative but very marginally significant. 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of extending copyright 
term from author’s life plus 50 years to author’s life plus 70 years on movie 
production is (−12.76 percent, 0.52 percent). By a one- tailed test, the 
hypothesis that copyright term extension had a positive impact on movie 
production is rejected with p 5 0.029.
to check the robustness of the results, we also do the following. First, we 
specify copyright term extension as an indicator rather than in the number 
of years by which term was extended. table 17.3, column (b), reports 
the results. the coefficients of the covariates other than the indicator of 
copyright term extension are substantially the same as in the baseline 
estimate. as might be expected with a coarser specification of the policy 
variable, the estimated impact of copyright is less precisely estimated. the 
95 percent confidence interval for the impact of copyright term extension 
is (−6.45 percent, 10.45 percent).
next, we estimate model (1) with the dependent variable specified as 
nationally produced movies, i.e., excluding co- productions. table 17.3, 
column (c), reports the results. Compared with the baseline estimate, the 
major differences are that the coefficient of Gdp per capita is not signifi-
cant, while the coefficient of the real interest rate is negative and significant. 
the coefficient of copyright term extension is negative and  significant. the 
95 percent confidence interval for the impact of copyright term extension 
on movie production is (−14.94 percent, 0.04 percent). By a one- tailed 
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test, the hypothesis that copyright term extension had a positive impact on 
movie production is rejected with p 5 0.019.
another possible source of measurement error is the data on movie 
production. as an alternative to imdB, we acquired information on movie 
production from Film index international (Fii), a proprietary database 
compiled by the British Film institute. we estimate the baseline specifica-
tion using the Fii movie data. table 17.3, column (d), reports the results. 
Compared with the baseline estimate, the major differences are that the 
coefficient of population is negative and marginally significant, while the 
coefficient of the real interest rate is negative and significant. the coef-
ficient of copyright term extension is negative but imprecisely estimated. 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of copyright term exten-
sion on movie production is (−14.48 percent, 23.94 percent).
imdB covers a larger number of movies than Fii. the correlation 
between the two data sets by country ranged between −0.2384 and 0.7135. 
to the best of our knowledge, all previous studies of the movie industry 
have used imdB rather than Fii. accordingly, we prefer the baseline esti-
mates, which use imdB data.
next, we consider the impact of anticipation and lags. the Copyright 
term directive was issued in october 1993, after substantial discussion 
(dworkin 1994). since the directive was retrospective, movie studios 
might have expanded production ahead of legislation. in table 17.3, 
column (e), we specify the effective date of copyright term extension as 
1993 for the original eU member states. relative to the baseline estimate, 
the major difference is that the coefficient of copyright term is positive, 
but not significant. this is possibly consistent with the notion that pro-
ducers anticipated the change in law. However, the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the impact of copyright term extension on movie production 
is (−3.62 percent, 12.30 percent). accordingly, it is difficult to accept that 
copyright term extension had a significant impact on movie production.
movie production takes time – at least 18 months between conception 
and release (vogel 2004: 53–5). we estimate model (1) with all time- varying 
covariates specified with a one- year lag, so, movie production in year t is 
regressed on co- variates for year t − 1. table 17.3, column (f), reports the 
results. relative to the baseline estimate, the major differences are that the 
coefficient of population is positive but not significant, and the coefficient 
of the real interest rate is positive and marginally significant, which results 
seem to cast doubt on this specification. the coefficient of copyright term 
extension is negative but imprecisely estimated. By a one- tailed test, the 
hypothesis that copyright term extension had a positive impact on movie 
production is rejected with p 5 0.105.
we then check for sensitivity to the sample countries. to account for the 
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possible influence of outliers, we also estimate model (1) using the stata 
procedure, robust regression, an iterative procedure which assigns larger 
weights to better- behaved observations. table 17.3, column (g), reports the 
results. relative to the baseline estimate, the major differences are that the 
coefficient of population is smaller and not significant, and the coefficient 
of copyright term extension is smaller in absolute value and not precisely 
estimated. By a one- tailed test, the hypothesis that copyright term exten-
sion had a positive impact on movie production is rejected with p 5 0.105.
Besides measurement error, timing, and sample selection, another pos-
sible source of bias is omission of relevant explanatory variables. the 
eU and member states systematically targeted movie production with 
government funding and tax incentives (Lange and westcott 2004). the 
only source of data on government incentives for movie production that 
we could find is the european audiovisual observatory’s Korda online 
database and earlier publications. this provides only information about 
government funding, and the coverage for the early 1990s is fragmentary.
Using the observatory data, we re- estimate model (1) including gov-
ernment funding as an additional explanatory variable. owing to limited 
data, the sample size is reduced by more than half. table 17.3, column (h), 
reports the results. the coefficient of Gdp per capita is negative and sig-
nificant, which calls the estimate into question. However, the estimate is 
consistent with the baseline estimate in that the coefficient of copyright 
term extension is negative and significant. By a one- tailed test, the hypoth-
esis that movie production was positively related to copyright term exten-
sion is rejected with p 5 0.000.
to sum up, having considered various specifications, anticipation and 
lags, alternative sub- samples and data sources, and possible missing 
variables, we find that copyright term extension did not have a significant 
impact on movie production.
3.3 Music and Books
as a further check of the robustness of our findings, we test the impact of 
the copyright term extension on the production of music Cds and books. 
we collected data on music Cds from the international Federation of the 
phonographic industry, and on books from the international publishers 
association (ipa) and UnesCo.
table 17.4 reports estimates of the baseline specification of model (1). 
the results are not very precise owing to the limited data on music Cds 
and books. For music, only the estimate for Cd albums (table 17.4, 
column (a)) seemed intuitively reasonable. the coefficients of Gdp per 
capita and population are positive and significant, while the coefficient 
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of the real interest rate is negative, albeit imprecisely estimated. the 
95 percent confidence interval for the impact of copyright term extension 
on movie production is (−5.92 percent, 3.72 percent).
For books, only the estimate using ipa data (table 17.4, column (c)) 
seemed intuitively reasonable. the coefficients of Gdp per capita and 
population are positive and the coefficient of the real interest rate is 
Table 17.4 Copyright term extension: Music and books
(a)
Cd albums
(b)
Cd releases
(c)
Books (ipa)
(d)
Books 
(UnesCo)
Gdp per capita 1.2175***
(0.4500)
2.8087***
(0.7437)
0.0968
(0.3084)
−2.3133***
(0.5533)
population 5.8365***
(0.5070)
4.8613***
(0.8535)
0.6251
(1.5163)
−32.0672***
(6.8182)
Computer  
  ownership
0.1171**
(0.0509)
−0.5610***
(0.1296)
−0.1565*
(0.0805)
−0.5496***
(0.1434)
internet access 0.0745***
(0.0263)
0.1755***
(0.0585)
0.0418
(0.0407)
0.0176
(0.0360)
real interest rate −0.1056*
(0.0630)
0.2889**
(0.1415)
−0.0361
(0.0882)
−0.8714***
(0.1110)
Copyright term  
  extension (years)
−0.0330
(0.0722)
−0.2823**
(0.1381)
−0.0358
(0.0938)
−0.7138***
(0.1976)
Constant 0.0000
(0.0000)
−52.0220***
(10.5018)
3.9084
(14.9491)
0.0000
(0.0000)
r- squared – – 0.195 –
Copyright impact 
(95% confidence 
interval)
(−5.92%, 
3.72%)
(−18.39%, 
0.27%)
(−7.49%, 
5.09%)
(−34.88%, 
7.92%)
one sided test for 
positive impact
0.324 0.0205 0.353 0.00015
no. of observations 61 73 162 25
no. of countries 6 7 24 5
Notes:
all estimates included year dummies.
the wooldridge tests for autocorrelation in panel data rejected the hypothesis that there 
was no first- order autocorrelation in specifications (a) − (c) but could not reject this null 
hypothesis in specification (d). the modified wald tests for group- wise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model rejected the hypothesis that there was no heteroskedasticity 
in specifications (a) − (d). accordingly, for specifications (a) and (b), we used FGLs with 
heteroskedastic error structure and intra- sectional autocorrelation. For specification (c), 
we used fixed effects estimation with clustered standard errors (in the FGLs estimate, most 
coefficients were zero). For specification (d), we used FGLs with heteroskedastic error 
structure and without intra- sectional autocorrelation or cross- sectional correlation.
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 negative, albeit imprecisely estimated. the 95 percent confidence inter-
val for the impact of copyright term extension on movie production is 
(−7.49 percent, 5.09 percent).
to the extent that these estimates are reasonable, they confirm 
our earlier finding that copyright term extension did not have a 
 significant  impact on movie production extended to music and books 
as well.
4. eUropean rentaL direCtive
on november 19, 1992, the eeC issued directive 92/100/eeC to harmo-
nize copyright laws with regard to rental and lending, and neighboring 
rights for performers, music and film producers, and broadcasters with 
effect from July 1, 1994.13 Like the Copyright term directive, the so- called 
‘rental directive’ was issued to harmonize copyright laws with the objec-
tive of forming a single european market.
prior to the issuance of  the rental directive, copyright law in 
european countries differed in whether creators of  works could control 
rental and lending. differences between the copyright laws of  denmark 
and U.K. came to a head in the Warner- Metronome case.14 a danish 
national bought video- tapes in the U.K. and offered them for rental in 
denmark. the producer of  the video- tapes sued to control rental of  the 
tapes. Under danish law, the producer could control rental, but not under 
U.K. law.15
also, prior to the directive, copyright law in european countries dif-
fered in the scope of ‘neighboring rights’ of creators other than authors. in 
particular, the rome Convention provided neighboring rights to perform-
ers, music producers, and broadcasters, but not movie producers (Geller 
1999: section 4[2][c][ii]).
the key changes required by directive 92/100/eeC were:
13 Council directive 92/100/eeC of 19 november 1992 on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property, O.J. no. L 346 of 27 november 1992, 616- 66. ‘neighboring rights’ are 
the european civil law name for the rights of creators, such as performers, music 
and movie producers, and broadcasters, who are not authors. in anglo- saxon 
common law, these rights are called copyrights.
14 Judgment of 17 may 1988, Case 158/86, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome 
Video Aps. v. Erik Viuff Christiansen, [1988] eCr 2605.
15 U.s. law does not allow the producer of a pre- recorded video- tape to control 
rental. mortimer (2008) estimated the impact of such control on U.s.  consumer 
welfare, and movie producer and retailer profits.
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●● article 1: exclusive rental and lending rights;
●● article 2: director of audiovisual work to be an author, presump-
tion of transfer of rights from performers to audio- visual producers, 
optional presumption of transfer of rights from authors to audio- 
visual producers;
●● article 4: author and performer to have unwaivable right to equit-
able remuneration from rental;
●● article 5: exception from exclusive lending right;
●● articles 6–9: (neighboring) rights of fixation, reproduction, broad-
casting and communication to the public, and distribution for per-
formers, music and movie producers, and broadcastersz
Based on the survey by reinbothe and von Lewinksi (1993), we compile 
in table 17.5 the compliance of existing national copyright law among 
eU and eFta members with articles 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6–9 of the rental 
directive. By our own further legal research, we tabulate the compliance of 
national copyright law in three countries – the Czech republic, Hungary, 
and poland – that subsequently joined the european Union.16
an entry ‘1’ indicates that the national copyright law complied with the 
corresponding article of the rental directive.17 where the national law did 
not comply with the directive (as indicated by ‘0’), the national law had 
to be revised. For the effective dates of the revisions of the national law 
to comply with the rental directive, we rely on a study by the european 
Commission (undated) and our own legal research.18 Following several 
revisions, the rental directive was superseded by directive 2006/115/eC, 
issued on december 12, 2006.19
the rental directive was particularly pertinent to the movie indus-
try. it was issued specifically to address an inconsistency in rental rights 
between U.K. and denmark. Further, it closed a gap left by the rome 
Convention, which provided neighboring rights to performers, music pro-
ducers, and broadcasters, but not movie producers. these are additional 
16 our own legal research was based on Geller (1999) and the online collec-
tion of copyright laws provided by the world intellectual property organization 
(http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/index.jsp).
17 where relevant, table 17.5 focused on the changes as they affected movie 
producers.
18 according to the european Commission (undated), as of 1999, ireland had 
not complied with the rental directive. ireland passed the relevant legislation in 
2000, but the effective date was not clear. For the baseline estimate, we assume that 
the effective date for ireland was 2000. we also estimated the baseline specification 
with the effective date for ireland as 1994, and found similar results (unreported).
19 O.J. no. L 376 of 27 december 2006, 28–35.
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reasons, besides the absence of sequential innovation, to focus on movies 
in  studying the impact of the rental directive.
4.1 Data and Specification
as with the study of copyright term, we collect data on movie production 
from the imdB and apply a difference in differences estimation strategy, 
exploiting differences among countries as to when and the extent to which 
they revised their copyright law to conform with the rental directive. we 
specify movie production in country i and year t as
 log(moviesit) 5 f(direCtiveit, Xit), (2)
where direCtiveit is a measure of compliance with the rental directive 
in country i and year t, and Xit is a vector of other variables that might pos-
sibly affect movie production.
referring to table 17.5, the survey of reinbothe and von Lewinksi 
(1993) and our own legal research was incomplete for compliance with 
articles 5, 6, and 8 of the rental directive. intuitively, the public lending 
right (article 5) and right of first fixation for performers (article 6) seemed 
relatively unimportant to movie producers. Further, article 8 applied to 
performers, music producers, and broadcasters only (reinbothe and von 
Lewinski 1993: 92). Hence, we disregard these articles.
with regard to the other indicators of compliance – with articles 1 
(rental), 2 (lending), 3 (presumption of transfer), 4 (unwaivable right of 
remuneration), 7 (reproduction), and 9 (distribution), our information on 
compliance is almost complete. However, as reported in table 17.6 below, 
the indicators are highly collinear. rather than omit particular indica-
tors, we apply principal components analysis to generate one composite 
measure of compliance from the six indicators.20
we use the same data- set as for the study of copyright term extension, 
except that our study of the rental directive is limited to european coun-
tries as the directive did not apply elsewhere. as a preliminary, Figure 17.3 
below illustrates, for each european country, movie production and the 
degree of compliance with the directive over the period 1991–2005. the 
graphs suggest that the rental directive did not have any systematic 
impact on movie production.
20 we checked the robustness of this approach by using the alternative of 
building a composite indicator by simply adding the six compliance indicators. 
the results were similar.
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4.2 Estimates
our baseline specification of model (2) is a regression of movie production 
on compliance with the rental directive, as well as various demographic 
and financial characteristics – Gdp per capita, population, computer 
ownership and internet access, and real interest rate, with year and country 
fixed effects. as a preliminary, we test for and detect heteroskedasticity but 
not serial correlation. accordingly, we estimate the baseline specification 
using feasible generalized least squares.
table 17.7, column (a), reports the baseline estimate. the coefficients 
of Gdp per capita and population are positive and significant, and the 
coefficient of the real interest rate is negative, albeit insignificant. the coef-
ficient of the compliance indicator is negative and marginally significant. 
an instructive measure of the impact of the rental directive is the effect 
of increasing from zero to 100 percent compliance with the directive. 
Based on the mean number of movies produced, the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the impact of increasing from zero to 100 percent compliance 
on movie production was (−27.02%, 2.22%). By a one- tailed test, the 
hypothesis that copyright term extension had a positive impact on movie 
production is rejected with p 5 0.0328.
we checked the robustness of our findings in the following ways. First, 
we re- estimate model (2) using national productions instead of movies 
adjusted for co- production. as reported in table 17.7, column (b), the 
results are very similar to the baseline estimate, except that the coefficient 
of the compliance indicator is less precisely estimated. accordingly, the 
95 percent confidence interval for the impact of increasing from zero 
to 100  percent compliance on movie production is somewhat wider at 
(−31.84%, 5.24%).
next, we check the sensitivity of our results to the measure of com-
pliance. an alternative indicator is simply the sum of the indicators 
of  compliance with articles 1 (rental), 2 (lending), 3 (presumption of 
Table 17.6 Indicators of compliance with Directive: Correlations
rental Lending presumption remuneration reproduction distribution
rental 1
Lending 0.8757 1
presumption 0.8477 0.7866 1
remuneration 0.8224 0.8224 0.8479 1
reproduction 0.641 0.641 0.5484 0.6468 1
distribution 0.7197 0.7853 0.6955 0.7536 0.7815 1
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 transfer), 4 (unwaivable right of remuneration), 7 (reproduction), and 
9 (distribution). as reported in table 17.7, column (c), the results were 
almost identical to the baseline estimate. the 95 percent confidence inter-
val for the impact of increasing from zero to 100 percent compliance on 
movie production is (−26.90%, 2.30%). By a one- tailed test, the hypothesis 
that copyright term extension had a positive impact on movie production 
is rejected with p 5 0.0336.
next, we consider the effect of anticipation and lags. the rental 
directive was issued in november 1992, after substantial discussion 
(reinbothe and von Lewinksi 1993). since the directive was retrospective, 
movie studios might have expanded production ahead of legislation. we 
re- estimate model (2) with the effective date of the rental directive speci-
fied as 1992 for the original eU member states. as reported in table 17.7, 
column (d), the results are similar to the baseline estimate except that the 
coefficient of the compliance indicator is positive, albeit not significant.
this result is reminiscent of our analysis of copyright term extension 
above. it is possibly consistent with the notion that producers anticipated 
the change in law. However, the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
impact of the rental directive on movie production is (−5.87%, 46.27%). 
accordingly, it is difficult to accept that the rental directive had a signifi-
cant impact on movie production.
as noted above, movie production takes time. to check the sensitivity to 
lags in movie producers’ response to the rental directive, we re- estimate 
model (2) with all time- varying covariates specified with a one- year lag. as 
reported in table 17.7, column (e), the results are similar to the baseline 
estimate. the coefficient of the compliance indicator is negative but not 
significant, and provided the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact 
of the rental directive on movie production as (−26.07%, 4.67%). By a 
one- tailed test, the hypothesis that copyright term extension had a positive 
impact on movie production is rejected with p 5 0.0671.
we then check for sensitivity to the sample countries. to account for 
the possible influence of outliers, we re- estimate model (2) using the stata 
procedure, robust regression. as reported in table 17.7, column (f), the 
results are similar to the baseline estimate except that the coefficient of 
the compliance indicator is not precisely estimated. the 95 percent confi-
dence interval for the impact of the rental directive on movie production 
is (−25.32%, 10.00%). By a one- tailed test, the hypothesis that copyright 
term extension had a positive impact on movie production is rejected with 
p 5 0.1785.
Besides measurement error, timing, and sample selection, another pos-
sible source of bias is omission of relevant explanatory variables. the 
obvious possibly omitted variable is other legal changes that took effect 
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at the same time as the rental directive. Besides the rental directive, 
there were just two major developments in copyright law applicable to the 
european movie industry in the 1990s (Helberger 2000). they were:
●● european Copyright term directive, mentioned above, and
●● the wipo Copyright treaty, 1996, which created the rights of dis-
tribution, rental, and communication to the public.
it was agreed that the wipo Copyright treaty would come into effect 
three months after 30 member states had deposited instruments of ratifica-
tion or accession. the treaty came into effect only in march 2002, follow-
ing the accession by Gabon. Hence, it is unlikely that the wipo Copyright 
treaty would have affected movie production in the 1990s. moreover, the 
content of the treaty substantially overlapped with the rental directive.
By contrast, the european Copyright term directive took effect around 
the same time as the rental directive. we estimate the baseline specifica-
tion including the number of years by which copyright term was extended 
to comply with the Copyright term directive as an additional explanatory 
variable. as reported in table 17.7, column (g), the results are similar to 
the baseline estimate except that the coefficient of the compliance indica-
tor is not precisely estimated. the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
impact of the rental directive on movie production is (−26.37%, 8.71%) 
By a one- tailed test, the hypothesis that copyright term extension had a 
positive impact on movie production is rejected with p 5 0.140.
Besides contemporaneous legal changes, another possible omitted vari-
able is government funding. we re- estimate model (2) including govern-
ment funding as an additional explanatory variable. owing to limited data, 
the sample size is reduced by more than a third. as reported in table 17.7, 
column (h), the coefficient of the indicator of compliance with the rental 
directive is positive but not significant. the 95 percent confidence interval 
for the impact of the rental directive on movie production was (−6.90%, 
71.50%). However, we note that the coefficient of Gdp per capita is nega-
tive, albeit not significant, which does cast some doubt on this estimate.
4.3 Music and Books
as a further check of the robustness of our findings, we test the impact 
of the rental directive on the production of music Cds and books. 
table 17.8 reports estimates of the baseline specification of model (2).
the results are not very precise owing to the limited data on music 
Cds and books. For music, only the estimate for Cd albums (table 17.8, 
column (a)) seems intuitively reasonable. the coefficients of Gdp per 
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capita and population are positive and significant, while the coefficient of 
the real interest rate is positive, albeit imprecisely estimated. the 95 percent 
confidence interval for the impact of the rental directive on movie pro-
duction is (−23.12%, 0.12%). By a one- tailed test, the hypothesis that copy-
right term extension had a positive impact on music production is rejected 
with p 5 0.017.
For books, only the estimate using ipa data (table 17.8, column (c)) 
seems intuitively reasonable. the coefficients of Gdp per capita and 
Table 17.8 Rental Directive: Music and books
(a)
Cd albums
(b)
Cd  
releases
(c)
Books  
(ipa)
(d)
Books 
(UnesCo)
Gdp per capita 3.9066***
(0.9325)
−1.6902
(1.1221)
0.4427*
(0.2533)
−2.4993***
(0.6927)
population 6.4114***
(0.4298)
2.9534***
(1.0166)
1.3156**
(0.6093)
−21.8557***
(6.9144)
Computer ownership 0.1502
(0.1328)
−0.2360
(0.1629)
−0.1896**
(0.0787)
−0.5744***
(0.1676)
internet access 0.0924**
(0.0449)
0.0403
(0.0970)
−0.0125
(0.0180)
0.0605*
(0.0342)
real interest rate 0.0381
(0.0900)
0.2724*
(0.1431)
−0.0336
(0.0763)
−0.7809***
(0.1344)
Compliance indicator −0.0214**
(0.0101)
−0.0127
(0.0172)
−0.0001
(0.0053)
−0.0054
(0.0105)
Constant 0.0000
(0.0000)
−19.3890
(13.5193)
−4.5225
(6.9637)
0.0000
(0.0000)
impact of compliance  
  (95% confidence 
interval)
−23.12%~
0.12%
−27.17%~
13.21%
−6.09%~
5.98%
−15.13%~
9.09%
r- square – – – –
one sided test for  
  positive impact
0.0170 0.230 0.493 0.305
no. of observations 33 45 117 25
no. of countries 4 5 16 5
Notes: all estimates included year dummies. the wooldridge tests for autocorrelation 
in panel data rejected the hypothesis that there was no first- order autocorrelation in 
specifications (b) and (c) but could not reject this null hypothesis in specification (a) and (d). 
the modified wald tests for group- wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
rejected the hypothesis that there was no heteroskedasticity in specifications (a) − (d). 
accordingly, in specification (a) and (d), we used FGLs with heteroskedastic error structure 
and without intra- sectional autocorrelation, while in specifications (b) and (c), we used 
FGLs with heteroskedastic error structure and intra- sectional autocorrelation.
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 population are positive and significant, while the coefficient of the real 
interest rate is negative, albeit imprecisely estimated. the 95 percent con-
fidence interval for the rental directive on movie production is (−6.09%, 
5.98%).
to the extent that these estimates are reasonable, they confirm our 
earlier finding that the rental directive did not have a significant impact 
on movie production extended to music and books as well.
5. ConCLUdinG remarKs
the extension of copyright term and european rental directive were 
particularly pertinent to the movie industry. among the various forms of 
creative work, movies are particularly long- lived (rapapport 1998), hence 
movie producers would benefit most from extension of copyright term. 
the rental directive was published specifically to address an inconsist-
ency in copyright law regarding rental rights between european countries 
and to extend neighboring rights to film producers. moreover, unlike other 
copyrightable products such as software, databases, and books, sequential 
innovation is not important in movies. Hence, if  major changes in copy-
right law had no discernable impact on movie production, it seems the case 
for copyright law is weak indeed.
For future work, the most obvious direction is to study the produc-
tion of  creative work more deeply, to better understand the intermediate 
links between copyright law and creative output. How does copyright 
law affect investment in creative activity? and, how do these investments 
translate into the quantity and quality of  creative work? perhaps such 
a structural analysis might reveal effects of  copyright that our reduced 
form approach (directly measuring the impact on production) did not 
uncover.
the other direction for future research is to measure the impact of 
copyright law on the use of existing creative work, and specifically, on 
the benefit to end- users and also investment in creations that build upon 
earlier work.
with the results from these studies, it would then be possible to gauge 
the fundamental trade- off  in copyright law between the incentive to create 
new work and the loss from restricting use of existing work. However, the 
key challenge in all of these directions for future work would be to acquire 
the relevant data.
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